Me raportimet se mij\u00ebra trupa tok\u00ebsore amerikane mund t\u00eb d\u00ebrgohen drejt Lindjes s\u00eb Mesme, v\u00ebmendja \u00ebsht\u00eb p\u00ebrqendruar te nj\u00eb objektiv i mundsh\u00ebm: ishulli Kharg i Iranit, nj\u00eb qend\u00ebr ky\u00e7e energjetike n\u00eb veri t\u00eb Gjirit Persik q\u00eb p\u00ebrpunon rreth 90% t\u00eb eksporteve t\u00eb naft\u00ebs s\u00eb vendit.<\/p>\n
Por kjo \u00ebsht\u00eb vet\u00ebm nj\u00eb pjes\u00eb e historis\u00eb. Sepse Kharg nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb i vetmi q\u00eb ka pesh\u00eb strategjike. N\u00eb fakt, disa ishuj t\u00eb tjer\u00eb mund t\u00eb jen\u00eb edhe m\u00eb vendimtar\u00eb p\u00ebr kontrollin real t\u00eb rajonit.<\/p>\n
B\u00ebhet fjal\u00eb p\u00ebr Abu Musa, Tunb i Madh, Tunb i Vog\u00ebl, Hengam, Qeshm, Larak dhe Hormuz. S\u00eb bashku, k\u00ebta ishuj krijojn\u00eb at\u00eb q\u00eb studiuesit e quajn\u00eb \u201cmbrojtja harkore\u201d e Iranit \u2013 nj\u00eb struktur\u00eb q\u00eb i jep Teheranit avantazh konkret mbi l\u00ebvizjen detare n\u00eb Ngushtic\u00ebn e Hormuzit.<\/p>\n
N\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb rrjet, tre ishujt m\u00eb t\u00eb vegj\u00ebl \u2013 Abu Musa dhe dy Tunb-et \u2013 jan\u00eb thelb\u00ebsor\u00eb. Pozicioni i tyre dhe kushtet gjeografike b\u00ebjn\u00eb q\u00eb anijet e m\u00ebdha dhe cisternat t\u00eb kalojn\u00eb detyrimisht pran\u00eb tyre. Kjo i kthen automatikisht n\u00eb pika presioni: kush kontrollon k\u00ebta ishuj, ka n\u00eb sh\u00ebnjest\u00ebr \u00e7do kalim.<\/p>\n
Pik\u00ebrisht p\u00ebr k\u00ebt\u00eb arsye, ata jan\u00eb ideal\u00eb p\u00ebr operacione me mjete t\u00eb shpejta, mina detare apo drone t\u00eb Gard\u00ebs Revolucionare. Nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb e nevojshme t\u00eb bllokosh fizikisht ngushtic\u00ebn \u2013 mjafton ta b\u00ebsh t\u00eb rrezikshme p\u00ebr t\u2019u kaluar.<\/p>\n
Irani vet\u00eb i konsideron k\u00ebta ishuj si \u201caeroplanmbajt\u00ebse t\u00eb pal\u00ebvizshme dhe t\u00eb pafundosshme\u201d. Nj\u00eb p\u00ebrkufizim q\u00eb n\u00eb thelb tregon rolin e tyre: baza t\u00eb q\u00ebndrueshme nga ku mund t\u00eb projektohet forc\u00eb n\u00eb \u00e7do moment.<\/p>\n
Vitin e kaluar, Garda Revolucionare ka rritur pranin\u00eb n\u00eb k\u00ebto pika, duke theksuar se ka kapacitet t\u00eb godas\u00eb baza, anije dhe objektiva n\u00eb gjith\u00eb rajonin. Kjo do t\u00eb thot\u00eb se \u00e7do operacion p\u00ebr t\u00eb garantuar kalimin e lir\u00eb n\u00eb Hormuz nuk mund t\u2019i anashkaloj\u00eb k\u00ebta ishuj \u2013 ata duhet neutralizuar m\u00eb par\u00eb.<\/p>\n
Dhe k\u00ebtu nis kompleksiteti real. Sepse k\u00ebta ishuj jan\u00eb t\u00eb vendosur n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb t\u00eb till\u00eb q\u00eb krijojn\u00eb nj\u00eb zinxhir mbrojt\u00ebs. P\u00ebr t\u00eb hyr\u00eb n\u00eb Gjirin Persik, forcat duhet t\u00eb p\u00ebrballen me disa pika strategjike nj\u00ebra pas tjetr\u00ebs.<\/p>\n
N\u00eb planin ushtarak, opsionet jan\u00eb dy: aj\u00ebr ose det. Zbarkimi nga deti lejon transportin e pajisjeve t\u00eb r\u00ebnda, por k\u00ebrkon kalimin p\u00ebrmes zonave t\u00eb fortifikuara. Operacionet ajrore jan\u00eb m\u00eb t\u00eb shpejta, por m\u00eb t\u00eb ekspozuara ndaj mbrojtjes ajrore iraniane.<\/p>\n
Edhe n\u00eb rast suksesi, operacioni nuk do t\u00eb ishte i shkurt\u00ebr. Marrja e ishujve mund t\u00eb zgjas\u00eb nga disa dit\u00eb deri n\u00eb dy jav\u00eb dhe do t\u00eb lejonte vendosjen e radar\u00ebve dhe forcave p\u00ebr t\u00eb monitoruar ngushtic\u00ebn dhe p\u00ebr t\u2019i mohuar Iranit p\u00ebrdorimin e tyre.<\/p>\n
Por sfida m\u00eb e madhe vjen m\u00eb pas. Mbajtja e kontrollit k\u00ebrkon rreth 1,800 deri n\u00eb 2,000 trupa, t\u00eb cil\u00ebt do t\u00eb ishin vazhdimisht n\u00ebn k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimin e raketave, dron\u00ebve dhe artileris\u00eb nga territori iranian. Pra, rreziku \u00ebsht\u00eb q\u00eb operacioni t\u00eb kthehet n\u00eb nj\u00eb angazhim t\u00eb gjat\u00eb dhe t\u00eb v\u00ebshtir\u00eb p\u00ebr t\u2019u menaxhuar politikisht.<\/p>\n
N\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb kontekst, disa analist\u00eb argumentojn\u00eb se marrja e k\u00ebtyre ishujve \u00ebsht\u00eb m\u00eb pak e d\u00ebmshme sesa goditja e Kharg, pasi shkat\u00ebrrimi i infrastruktur\u00ebs s\u00eb tij do t\u00eb ndikonte r\u00ebnd\u00eb n\u00eb rim\u00ebk\u00ebmbjen ekonomike t\u00eb Iranit pas konfliktit.<\/p>\n
Megjithat\u00eb, ekziston edhe nj\u00eb dimension politik q\u00eb e komplikon gjith\u00e7ka. Ishujt Abu Musa dhe Tunb\u00ebt jan\u00eb objekt mosmarr\u00ebveshjeje mes Iranit dhe Emirateve t\u00eb Bashkuara Arabe q\u00eb prej vitit 1971.<\/p>\n
Kjo krijon nj\u00eb dilem\u00eb t\u00eb qart\u00eb p\u00ebr SHBA: n\u00ebse ishujt i rikthehen Iranit, rrezikohen marr\u00ebdh\u00ebniet me Emiratet; n\u00ebse u jepen Emirateve, mund t\u00eb vihet n\u00eb dyshim legjitimiteti i \u00e7do qeverie t\u00eb re iraniane.<\/p>\n
N\u00eb fund, tabloja \u00ebsht\u00eb kjo: nuk b\u00ebhet fjal\u00eb vet\u00ebm p\u00ebr nj\u00eb operacion ushtarak, por p\u00ebr nj\u00eb ekuacion kompleks ku nd\u00ebrthuren strategjia, ekonomia dhe politika.<\/p>\n
Dhe si\u00e7 theksojn\u00eb ekspert\u00ebt, n\u00eb situata t\u00eb tilla nuk ka zgjidhje perfekte. Ka vet\u00ebm nj\u00eb balanc\u00eb mes rrezikut, kostos dhe pasojave \u2013 disa t\u00eb parashikueshme, t\u00eb tjera jo.\/CNN<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Me raportimet se mij\u00ebra trupa tok\u00ebsore amerikane mund t\u00eb d\u00ebrgohen drejt Lindjes s\u00eb Mesme, v\u00ebmendja \u00ebsht\u00eb p\u00ebrqendruar te nj\u00eb objektiv i mundsh\u00ebm: ishulli Kharg i Iranit, nj\u00eb qend\u00ebr ky\u00e7e energjetike n\u00eb veri t\u00eb Gjirit Persik q\u00eb p\u00ebrpunon rreth 90% t\u00eb eksporteve t\u00eb naft\u00ebs s\u00eb vendit. Por kjo \u00ebsht\u00eb vet\u00ebm nj\u00eb pjes\u00eb e historis\u00eb. Sepse Kharg […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":0,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-78551","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/zennihost.com\/test\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/78551","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/zennihost.com\/test\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/zennihost.com\/test\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zennihost.com\/test\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=78551"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/zennihost.com\/test\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/78551\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/zennihost.com\/test\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=78551"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zennihost.com\/test\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=78551"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zennihost.com\/test\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=78551"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}