{"id":27105,"date":"2025-06-20T13:54:32","date_gmt":"2025-06-20T13:54:32","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/zennihost.com\/test\/2025\/06\/20\/dosja-e-spiunazhit-qe-e-coi-izraelin-ne-lufte\/"},"modified":"2025-06-20T13:54:32","modified_gmt":"2025-06-20T13:54:32","slug":"dosja-e-spiunazhit-qe-e-coi-izraelin-ne-lufte","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/zennihost.com\/test\/2025\/06\/20\/dosja-e-spiunazhit-qe-e-coi-izraelin-ne-lufte\/","title":{"rendered":"Dosja e spiunazhit q\u00eb e \u00e7oi Izraelin n\u00eb luft\u00eb"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>The Economist<\/p>\n<p>Kur Izraeli nisi luft\u00ebn kund\u00ebr Iranit m\u00eb 13 qershor, e b\u00ebri k\u00ebt\u00eb n\u00eb baz\u00eb t\u00eb informacioneve t\u00eb inteligjenc\u00ebs q\u00eb pretendonte se Irani kishte arritur n\u00eb nj\u00eb \u201cpik\u00eb pa kthim\u201d n\u00eb p\u00ebrpjekjen e tij p\u00ebr nj\u00eb arm\u00eb b\u00ebrthamore. K\u00ebto prova e nxit\u00ebn vet\u00eb establishmentin e siguris\u00eb s\u00eb Izraelit p\u00ebr t\u00eb mb\u00ebshtetur nj\u00eb sulm menj\u00ebher\u00eb. I \u00ebsht\u00eb treguar Amerik\u00ebs dhe partner\u00ebve t\u00eb tjer\u00eb per\u00ebndimor\u00eb, me sa duket duke luajtur nj\u00eb rol t\u00eb r\u00ebnd\u00ebsish\u00ebm n\u00eb vendimmarrjen e tyre t\u00eb vazhdueshme n\u00ebse do ta mb\u00ebshtesin apo do t\u2019i bashkohen luft\u00ebs. The Economist nuk e ka par\u00eb materialin\/dosjen drejtp\u00ebrdrejt, por ka mwsuar informacione ekskluzive nga nj\u00eb burim autoritar, qw jep nj\u00eb pwrshkrim t\u00eb dosjeve t\u00eb Izraelit, si\u00e7 jan\u00eb ndar\u00eb me aleat\u00ebt e tij, dhe pretendimet q\u00eb ata b\u00ebjn\u00eb n\u00eb lidhje me uraniumin e pasuruar dhe p\u00ebrshpejtimin e programit t\u00eb Iranit. Disa nga detajet jan\u00eb tashm\u00eb t\u00eb njohura, ndwrsa disa jan\u00eb t\u00eb reja. K\u00ebto pretendime po rezultojnw t\u00eb diskutueshme, me sh\u00ebrbimet e inteligjenc\u00ebs t\u00eb disa vendeve per\u00ebndimore t\u00eb kujdesshme n\u00eb lidhje me af\u00ebrsin\u00eb e k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimit iranian dhe shenja t\u00eb p\u00ebr\u00e7arjeve brenda administrat\u00ebs s\u00eb Presidentit Donald Trump. Raporti yn\u00eb ofron kontekst mbi k\u00ebto mosmarr\u00ebveshje.<\/p>\n<p>Ne (The Economist) kuptojm\u00eb q\u00eb informacioni i paraqitur nga Izraeli p\u00ebrfshin nj\u00eb p\u00ebrshkrim t\u00eb detajuar t\u00eb nj\u00eb shtytje t\u00eb koh\u00ebve t\u00eb fundit, m\u00eb urgjente, nga shkenc\u00ebtar\u00ebt iranian\u00eb drejt \u201carmatimit\u201d, ose krijimit t\u00eb nj\u00eb pajisjeje shp\u00ebrthyese b\u00ebrthamore. Dosja ofron dy prova kryesore t\u00eb raportuara p\u00ebr k\u00ebt\u00eb pretendim. E para \u00ebsht\u00eb se nj\u00eb ekip shkencor Iranian, zotwron fshehurazi nj\u00eb sasi materiali b\u00ebrthamor, me status t\u00eb paqart\u00eb pasurimi, q\u00eb \u00ebsht\u00eb i panjohur p\u00ebr monitoruesit e Agjencis\u00eb Nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare t\u00eb Energjis\u00eb Atomike (IAEA), nj\u00eb organ mbik\u00ebqyr\u00ebs i OKB-s\u00eb (m\u00eb 9 qershor IAEA vler\u00ebsoi se Irani kishte rezerva zyrtare prej mbi 400 kg uranium t\u00eb pasuruar shum\u00eb). Pjesa e dyt\u00eb e provave t\u00eb raportuara \u00ebsht\u00eb se shkenc\u00ebtar\u00ebt kan\u00eb p\u00ebrshpejtuar pun\u00ebn e tyre dhe ishin gati t\u00eb takoheshin me komandant\u00ebt e korpusit raketor t\u00eb Iranit, me sa duket p\u00ebr t\u2019u p\u00ebrgatitur p\u00ebr \u201c\u00e7iftimin\u201d e nj\u00eb koke b\u00ebrthamore me nj\u00eb raket\u00eb.<\/p>\n<p>Pjesa m\u00eb e madhe e angazhimit t\u00eb m\u00ebparsh\u00ebm t\u00eb Iranit me k\u00ebrkime dhe aktivitete t\u00eb lidhura me arm\u00ebt b\u00ebrthamore ishte tashm\u00eb n\u00eb domeinin publik. IAEA ka publikuar disa raporte q\u00eb e dokumentojn\u00eb k\u00ebt\u00eb, t\u00eb nxjerra pjes\u00ebrisht nga inteligjenca e ofruar nga Izraeli dhe vende t\u00eb tjera. N\u00eb vitin 2018, nj\u00eb ekip n\u00eb Universitetin e Harvardit publikoi gjithashtu analiz\u00ebn e tyre t\u00eb dokumenteve iraniane t\u00eb vjedhura nga Izraeli. T\u00eb marra s\u00eb bashku, k\u00ebto burime p\u00ebrshkruan nj\u00eb p\u00ebrpjekje t\u00eb gjer\u00eb dhe t\u00eb q\u00ebndrueshme iraniane drejt krijimit t\u00eb nj\u00eb b\u00ebrthame uraniumi p\u00ebr nj\u00eb bomb\u00eb, eksploziv\u00ebt e nevojsh\u00ebm p\u00ebr t\u00eb shp\u00ebrthyer at\u00eb b\u00ebrtham\u00eb n\u00eb m\u00ebnyr\u00eb q\u00eb t\u00eb shkaktoj\u00eb nj\u00eb reaksion zinxhir dhe nj\u00eb program p\u00ebr t\u00eb vendosur nj\u00eb ngarkes\u00eb sferike n\u00eb raket\u00ebn balistike Shahab-3 t\u00eb Iranit. N\u00eb nj\u00eb raport t\u00eb publikuar m\u00eb 31 maj, IAEA vuri n\u00eb dukje se n\u00eb vitin 2003 Irani kishte planifikuar t\u00eb kryente at\u00eb q\u00eb Instituti p\u00ebr Shkenc\u00eb dhe Siguri Nd\u00ebrkomb\u00ebtare, nj\u00eb grup ekspert\u00ebsh, e quan nj\u00eb \u201ctest t\u00eb ftoht\u00eb\u201d \u2013 nj\u00eb arm\u00eb b\u00ebrthamore e simuluar q\u00eb p\u00ebrdor uranium natyral ose t\u00eb varf\u00ebruar n\u00eb vend t\u00eb uraniumit t\u00eb grad\u00ebs s\u00eb arm\u00ebve.<\/p>\n<p>Vler\u00ebsimet e inteligjenc\u00ebs s\u00eb Izraelit p\u00ebrs\u00ebrisin disa nga k\u00ebto informacione. Ato pretendojn\u00eb se nj\u00eb grup shkenc\u00ebtar\u00ebsh iranian\u00eb kan\u00eb punuar p\u00ebr vite me radh\u00eb n\u00eb k\u00ebrkime t\u00eb hapura dhe t\u00eb fshehta n\u00eb lidhje me arm\u00ebt. Kjo p\u00ebrpjekje ishte fillimisht pjes\u00eb e programit zyrtar t\u00eb k\u00ebrkimit t\u00eb arm\u00ebve b\u00ebrthamore t\u00eb Iranit, i njohur si AMAD, t\u00eb cilin Irani e mbylli n\u00eb vitin 2003, ndoshta sepse kishte frik\u00eb nga nj\u00eb sulm amerikan. Puna e vazhdueshme e shkenc\u00ebtar\u00ebve mendohet se kryhet n\u00ebn Organizat\u00ebn e Iranit p\u00ebr Inovacion dhe K\u00ebrkim Mbrojt\u00ebs (e njohur edhe me akronimin e saj n\u00eb persisht, SPND), n\u00ebn mbules\u00ebn e aktivitetit n\u00eb fusha si vaksinat kund\u00ebr covid-19 dhe teknologjia lazer. Nj\u00eb nga nj\u00eb num\u00ebr i vog\u00ebl jo-shkenc\u00ebtar\u00ebsh q\u00eb ishin n\u00eb dijeni t\u00eb pun\u00ebs ishte Gjeneral Major Mohammad Bagheri, i cili si shef i shtabit t\u00eb ushtris\u00eb s\u00eb Iranit kishte mbik\u00ebqyrje si t\u00eb forcave t\u00eb armatosura t\u00eb rregullta ashtu edhe t\u00eb Korpusit t\u00eb Gard\u00ebs Revolucionare Islamike (IRGC).<\/p>\n<p>Por dosjet e inteligjenc\u00ebs izraelite p\u00ebrmbajn\u00eb gjithashtu informacione q\u00eb, n\u00ebse jan\u00eb t\u00eb sakta, jan\u00eb v\u00ebrtet t\u00eb reja. Ato sugjerojn\u00eb se af\u00ebrsisht gjasht\u00eb vjet m\u00eb par\u00eb shkenc\u00ebtar\u00ebt formuan nj\u00eb \u201cGrup t\u00eb Progresit Special\u201d sekret, n\u00ebn kujdesin e ish-drejtorit t\u00eb AMAD-it, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. Q\u00ebllimi i k\u00ebtij grupi ishte t\u00eb p\u00ebrgatiste rrug\u00ebn p\u00ebr nj\u00eb proces shum\u00eb m\u00eb t\u00eb shpejt\u00eb t\u00eb armatimit, n\u00ebse dhe kur t\u00eb merrej nj\u00eb vendim nga Ali Khamenei, udh\u00ebheq\u00ebsi suprem i Iranit, p\u00ebr t\u00eb nxituar p\u00ebr nj\u00eb bomb\u00eb. Z. Fakhrizadeh u vra nga Izraeli n\u00eb n\u00ebntor 2020. M\u00eb 13 qershor, n\u00eb or\u00ebt e para t\u00eb luft\u00ebs, qeveria izraelite publikoi detaje q\u00eb p\u00ebrshkruanin k\u00ebt\u00eb prapasken\u00eb. Por na \u00ebsht\u00eb th\u00ebn\u00eb se ajo gjithashtu ndau vler\u00ebsime t\u00eb m\u00ebtejshme me aleat\u00ebt q\u00eb sugjerojn\u00eb se Grupi i Progresit Special e rriti k\u00ebrkimin e tij n\u00eb fund t\u00eb vitit t\u00eb kaluar. Irani kishte nj\u00eb nxitje t\u00eb re p\u00ebr t\u00eb p\u00ebrparuar drejt nj\u00eb bombe. Ai po l\u00ebkundej nga ndikimi i kufizuar i sulmeve t\u00eb tij me raketa ndaj Izraelit dhe varf\u00ebrimi i mbrojtjes s\u00eb tij ajrore nga sulmet izraelite n\u00eb tetor 2024. Dhe po p\u00ebrballej me kolapsin e \u201cp\u00ebrfaq\u00ebsuesve\u201d t\u00eb tij, Hamasit dhe Hezbollahut, n\u00eb Gaza dhe Liban.<\/p>\n<p>S\u00eb fundmi, inteligjenca izraelite deklaron se ishte planifikuar nj\u00eb takim midis shkenc\u00ebtar\u00ebve dhe komandant\u00ebve t\u00eb forc\u00ebs ajrore t\u00eb Iranit, t\u00eb cil\u00ebt jan\u00eb p\u00ebrgjegj\u00ebs p\u00ebr raketat balistike. Informacioni i ndar\u00eb nga Izraeli me aleat\u00ebt e tij argumenton se ky takim i propozuar ishte nj\u00eb rubikon, me shefat e raketave q\u00eb u zbuluan p\u00ebr her\u00eb t\u00eb par\u00eb, duke sugjeruar nga ana tjet\u00ebr se planifikimi p\u00ebr procesin e \u201c\u00e7ift\u00ebzimit\u201d t\u00eb nj\u00eb pajisjeje b\u00ebrthamore me nj\u00eb kok\u00eb rakete ishte gati t\u00eb fillonte. Irani kishte b\u00ebr\u00eb disa nga k\u00ebto pun\u00eb n\u00eb t\u00eb kaluar\u00ebn \u2013 n\u00eb vitin 2011, IAEA citoi pretendime se Irani kishte b\u00ebr\u00eb studime modelimi kompjuterik p\u00ebr t\u00eb par\u00eb se si nj\u00eb \u201cngarkes\u00eb sferike\u201d, si\u00e7 \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb kok\u00eb rakete, do t\u2019i rezistonte stresit t\u00eb l\u00ebshimit n\u00eb nj\u00eb raket\u00eb balistike. Miniaturizimi dhe \u00e7ift\u00ebzimi i nj\u00eb koke rakete me nj\u00eb raket\u00eb jan\u00eb detyra shum\u00eb komplekse q\u00eb mund t\u2019i marrin Iranit ende nj\u00eb koh\u00eb t\u00eb konsiderueshme p\u00ebr t\u2019i zot\u00ebruar. Pretendimet e reja t\u00eb Izraelit po ushqejn\u00eb nj\u00eb komunitet amerikan t\u00eb inteligjenc\u00ebs q\u00eb tashm\u00eb ka nj\u00eb gam\u00eb t\u00eb gjer\u00eb pik\u00ebpamjesh mbi k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimin iranian. N\u00eb mars, Tulsi Gabbard, drejtoresha e inteligjenc\u00ebs komb\u00ebtare t\u00eb Amerik\u00ebs \u2013 dhe nj\u00eb kund\u00ebrshtare e hershme e luft\u00ebs me Iranin \u2013 p\u00ebrs\u00ebriti pik\u00ebpamjen se Irani nuk po nd\u00ebrtonte nj\u00eb arm\u00eb b\u00ebrthamore. Dit\u00ebt e fundit, Wall Street Journal, New York Times dhe CNN kan\u00eb raportuar se agjencit\u00eb amerikane t\u00eb inteligjenc\u00ebs jan\u00eb skeptike ndaj pretendimeve t\u00eb reja izraelite. M\u00eb 17 qershor, Rafael Grossi, drejtori i p\u00ebrgjithsh\u00ebm i IAEA-s, tha se agjencis\u00eb s\u00eb tij nuk i ishin paraqitur \u201cprova t\u00eb nj\u00eb p\u00ebrpjekjeje sistematike p\u00ebr t\u00eb kaluar n\u00eb nj\u00eb arm\u00eb b\u00ebrthamore\u201d, megjith\u00ebse nj\u00eb jav\u00eb m\u00eb par\u00eb IAEA konfirmoi se Irani \u201cnuk kishte deklaruar material b\u00ebrthamor dhe aktivitete t\u00eb lidhura me b\u00ebrthamoren\u201d n\u00eb tre vende t\u00eb padeklaruara n\u00eb Iran.<\/p>\n<p>Megjithat\u00eb, zoti Trump mund t\u00eb jet\u00eb ndikuar nga pik\u00ebpamja izraelite. M\u00eb 17 qershor ai deklaroi: \u201cNuk m\u00eb intereson \u00e7far\u00eb tha ajo\u201d, duke iu referuar znj. Gabbard. \u201cMendoj se ata ishin shum\u00eb af\u00ebr krijimit t\u00eb nj\u00eb bombe\u201d. David Albright, nj\u00eb fizikant b\u00ebrthamor amerikan dhe ekspert arm\u00ebsh, i cili konsultohet nga agjencit\u00eb e inteligjenc\u00ebs, thot\u00eb se shumica e pretendimeve t\u00eb p\u00ebrfshira n\u00eb dosjet e fundit izraelite \u201cpranohen p\u00ebrgjith\u00ebsisht midis komuniteteve t\u00eb inteligjenc\u00ebs per\u00ebndimore\u201d. Megjithat\u00eb, ai pranon se ka pretendime q\u00eb jan\u00eb t\u00eb reja p\u00ebr t\u00eb, n\u00eb lidhje me devijimin e materialit b\u00ebrthamor dhe sugjerimin e nj\u00eb takimi t\u00eb af\u00ebrt me forcat raketore. Dhe ai thot\u00eb se analist\u00ebt amerikan\u00eb t\u00eb inteligjenc\u00ebs gjithashtu pajtohen se Irani ka p\u00ebrshpejtuar p\u00ebrgatitjet p\u00ebr armatim \u2013 n\u00eb korrik t\u00eb vitit t\u00eb kaluar, drejtori i inteligjenc\u00ebs komb\u00ebtare hoqi formulimin tradicional se Irani \u201cnuk po nd\u00ebrmerr aktualisht aktivitetet kryesore t\u00eb zhvillimit t\u00eb arm\u00ebve b\u00ebrthamore t\u00eb nevojshme p\u00ebr t\u00eb prodhuar nj\u00eb pajisje b\u00ebrthamore t\u00eb testueshme\u201d n\u00eb nj\u00eb raport drejtuar Kongresit, sipas Wall Street Journal.<\/p>\n<p>Duke supozuar se dosjet e Izraelit jan\u00eb t\u00eb sakta nga ana faktike, ka ende vend p\u00ebr at\u00eb q\u00eb zoti Albright e quan \u201cinterpretimi i fakteve\u201d. Edhe n\u00ebse analist\u00ebt amerikan\u00eb pranojn\u00eb se Irani ka q\u00ebllimin t\u00eb prodhoj\u00eb nj\u00eb bomb\u00eb dhe e ka p\u00ebrshpejtuar veprimin p\u00ebr k\u00ebt\u00eb, ata mund t\u00eb mos pajtohen se ka kaluar nj\u00eb prag ose se k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimi \u00ebsht\u00eb v\u00ebrtet i af\u00ebrt. Nd\u00ebrkoh\u00eb, izraelit\u00ebt, thot\u00eb ai, \u201cmund t\u00eb mendojn\u00eb se \u00ebsht\u00eb pak m\u00eb shpejt dhe t\u00eb shqet\u00ebsohen p\u00ebr aft\u00ebsin\u00eb e tyre p\u00ebr t\u00eb zbuluar dhe vepruar n\u00eb koh\u00eb\u201d. Zyrtar\u00ebt izraelit\u00eb dikur paraqisnin vler\u00ebsimet e tyre p\u00ebr shtytjen b\u00ebrthamore t\u00eb Iranit duke p\u00ebrdorur afate kohore t\u00eb matura n\u00eb muaj dhe vite. Q\u00eb nga fillimi i luft\u00ebs, ata kan\u00eb folur p\u00ebr \u201cpik\u00ebn pa kthim\u201d \u2013 nj\u00eb moment n\u00eb t\u00eb cilin Izraeli nuk do t\u00eb ishte m\u00eb i aft\u00eb t\u00eb ndalonte nj\u00eb sulm iranian drejt nj\u00eb bombe. Benyamin Netanyahu, kryeministri i Izraelit, ka kaluar dekada duke paralajm\u00ebruar p\u00ebr k\u00ebrc\u00ebnimin nga Irani. Kjo do t\u00eb thot\u00eb se paragjykimi i konfirmimit \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb rrezik. Por q\u00ebndrimi i komunitetit t\u00eb inteligjenc\u00ebs s\u00eb Izraelit \u00ebsht\u00eb i unifikuar dhe n\u00eb p\u00ebrputhje me pik\u00ebpamjen e qeveris\u00eb. Ndoshta \u00ebsht\u00eb v\u00ebn\u00eb n\u00ebn presion politik, por \u00ebsht\u00eb p\u00ebrplasur me zotin Netanyahu dhe kryeministra t\u00eb tjer\u00eb n\u00eb lidhje me dosjen b\u00ebrthamore n\u00eb t\u00eb kaluar\u00ebn. Tani mb\u00ebshtet luft\u00ebn.<\/p>\n<p>Fizika b\u00ebrthamore \u00ebsht\u00eb shkenc\u00eb. Vler\u00ebsimi i inteligjenc\u00ebs nuk \u00ebsht\u00eb, por ka pasoja t\u00eb m\u00ebdha n\u00eb bot\u00ebn reale. N\u00eb vitin 2003, Amerika dhe aleat\u00ebt e saj shkuan n\u00eb luft\u00eb n\u00eb Irak bazuar n\u00eb vler\u00ebsime t\u00eb gabuara t\u00eb arm\u00ebve t\u00eb saj t\u00eb dyshuara t\u00eb shkat\u00ebrrimit n\u00eb mas\u00eb. N\u00eb sulmin hap\u00ebs t\u00eb luft\u00ebs m\u00eb 13 qershor, Izraeli vrau shkenc\u00ebtar\u00eb dhe zyrtar\u00eb ky\u00e7. Objektet b\u00ebrthamore jan\u00eb bombarduar. Izraelit\u00ebt pretendojn\u00eb se kan\u00eb eliminuar rrezikun e af\u00ebrt t\u00eb Iranit q\u00eb nxiton drejt armatimit. Megjithat\u00eb, kthimi prapa i programit b\u00ebrthamor t\u00eb Iranit me vite varet gjithashtu nga shkat\u00ebrrimi, ose t\u00eb pakt\u00ebn shkaktimi i d\u00ebmeve t\u00eb konsiderueshme, n\u00eb uzinat kryesore n\u00ebntok\u00ebsore t\u00eb pasurimit t\u00eb uraniumit t\u00eb Iranit n\u00eb Natanz dhe n\u00eb Fordow, t\u00eb cilat ende nuk jan\u00eb goditur. Z. Trump mund t\u00eb vendos\u00eb se kjo \u00ebsht\u00eb nj\u00eb pun\u00eb p\u00ebr Amerik\u00ebn, \u00e7far\u00ebdo q\u00eb thon\u00eb spiun\u00ebt e tij. \/The Economist<\/p>\n<p>The post <a href=\"https:\/\/lexo.al\/2025\/06\/dosja-e-spiunazhit-qe-e-coi-izraelin-ne-lufte\/\">Dosja e spiunazhit q\u00eb e \u00e7oi Izraelin n\u00eb luft\u00eb<\/a> appeared first on <a href=\"https:\/\/lexo.al\/\">www.lexo.al<\/a>.<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The Economist Kur Izraeli nisi luft\u00ebn kund\u00ebr Iranit m\u00eb 13 qershor, e b\u00ebri k\u00ebt\u00eb n\u00eb baz\u00eb t\u00eb informacioneve t\u00eb inteligjenc\u00ebs q\u00eb pretendonte se Irani kishte arritur n\u00eb nj\u00eb \u201cpik\u00eb pa kthim\u201d n\u00eb p\u00ebrpjekjen e tij p\u00ebr nj\u00eb arm\u00eb b\u00ebrthamore. K\u00ebto prova e nxit\u00ebn vet\u00eb establishmentin e siguris\u00eb s\u00eb Izraelit p\u00ebr t\u00eb mb\u00ebshtetur nj\u00eb sulm menj\u00ebher\u00eb. [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":0,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-27105","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/zennihost.com\/test\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/27105","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/zennihost.com\/test\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/zennihost.com\/test\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zennihost.com\/test\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=27105"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/zennihost.com\/test\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/27105\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/zennihost.com\/test\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=27105"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zennihost.com\/test\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=27105"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/zennihost.com\/test\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=27105"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}